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1  Introduction
The effective implementation of socio-economic rights (“SERs”) is crucial in 
the fight against poverty and underdevelopment,1 as they provide a framework 
through which accountability for poverty can be strengthened. These rights 
are aimed at addressing some of the underlying conditions of poverty such as 
lack of access to food, social security and assistance, health care and housing. 
They are therefore useful tools through which people can gain access to basic 
social services and resources, in order to improve their situations and live a 
dignified life.2 This is particularly important for disadvantaged groups such 
as those living in poverty. However, the extent to which SERs have and can 
contribute towards improving the situations of people living in poverty has 
been limited, to some extent, by the fact that their justiciability was (and in 
some cases still is) unsettled.3 Though the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948 (“UDHR”) recognised SERs as fundamental to a person’s well-
being and dignity,4 their justiciability was subsequently questioned; resulting 
in the adoption, in 1966, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)5 without a complaints6 mechanism, as was 
the case with its sister covenant, the International Covenant on Civil and 
* I would like to thank Professor Sandra Liebenberg for her useful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper; and the Community Law Centre for its institutional support during the preparation of the first draft 
of this article
1 See C Mbazira “Enforcing the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: Twenty years of Redundancy, Progression and Significant Strides” (2006) 6 AHRLJ 
333 333, where a similar point is advanced
2 S Liebenberg “South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights: An Effective Tool in 
Challenging Poverty?” (2002) 6 LDD 159 159
3 For further reading on reasons advanced for non-justiciability of socio-economic rights, see M Brennan 
“To Adjudicate and Enforce Socio-Economic Rights: South Africa Proves that Domestic Courts are a 
Viable Option” (2009) 9 QUTLJJ 64 65
4 Art 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) UN Doc A/810 at 71 (“UDHR”)  
5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316 (“ICESCR”)  
6 The term “complaints” as used in this article includes “communications” or “petitions”
       
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).7 In addition, while the ICCPR explicitly required 
States “to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy”,8 the ICESCR did 
not contain such an explicit provision. Consequently, until recent years, not 
much attention was paid to developing mechanisms for their enforcement, 
particularly at the United Nations (“UN”) level. The lack of a dedicated 
mechanism for these rights was seen as “starving the law of oxygen needed to 
develop a more coherent understanding” of these rights.9
The situation changed in 2008 with the adoption of the Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“OP-ICESCR”),10 which makes provision for a complaints mechanism for 
violations of SERs.11 The Protocol is seen as “an important mechanism 
to expose abuses that are typically linked to poverty, discrimination, and 
neglect, and that victims frequently endure in silence and helplessness”.12 
Once a State ratifies the OP-ICESCR, the effective enforcement of SERs and 
the provision of an effective remedy for their violation is the only way it can 
escape the adjudication of these rights under this new mechanism.13
Increasingly, litigation14 is becoming an attractive tool for human rights 
movements worldwide and is fundamental to building international justice.15 
International law mechanisms for litigating rights are useful for marginalised 
groups and people living in poverty based on their important role of ensuring 
that States meet the obligations they have committed to through the ratification 
of treaties, including the provision of effective remedies in cases of violations. 
The existence of international litigation mechanisms therefore encourages 
governments to ensure the availability of more effective local remedies in 
respect of SERs. The ability to litigate SERs at the global and regional levels 
further “enables international jurisprudence on these rights to develop in the 
context of concrete cases”, which would be a useful resource in developing 
national jurisprudence on SERs.16 However, it should be noted that national 
jurisprudence can also influence the development of international law.
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316 (“ICCPR”)
8 Art 2(3)(b)
9 M Scheinin & M Langford “Evolution or Revolution? – Extrapolating from the Experience of the Human 
Rights Committee” (2009) 27 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 97 100
10 The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008) UN 
General Assembly Resolution 63/117 (“OP-ICESCR”) is not yet in force, as it requires ten ratifications  
As of September 2011, it had been ratified by four States (Ecuador, El Salvador, Mongolia and Spain) and 
signed by 32 others  
11 The path to the adoption of the OP-ICESCR can be traced to as far back as 1948 when the UDHR was 
adopted  See L Chenwi “Correcting the Historical Asymmetry between Rights: The Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (2009) 9 AHRLJ 23 26-29, where 
it is traced from 1990; M Langford “Closing the Gap? – An Introduction to the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (2009) 27 Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights 1 3-9, where it is traced to as far back as 1948
12 L Arbour “Human Rights Made Whole” (2008) Policy Innovations <http://www policyinnovations org/
ideas/commentary/data/000068> (accessed 17-06-2011)
13 Brennan (2009) QUTLJJ 65
14 Litigation is used in this article broadly to refer to the process of taking a case through a judicial or quasi-
judicial treaty-body
15 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs “Litigating Human Rights: Promise v  Perils – 
Introduction” (2000) 2 Human Rights Dialogue 1 1
16 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 117
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This article assesses the mechanisms for litigating SERs at the international 
level. In particular, it focuses on four aspects (standing; admissibility criteria; 
standard of reviewing State compliance; and remedies and enforcement) 
of the complaints mechanisms under the OP-ICESCR and of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”) and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”). With regard 
to the OP-ICESCR and the African Court, the fact that the former mechanism 
is not yet in force and the latter is relatively new yet undergoing structural 
changes, implies that the scope of this article is limited to an analysis of their 
potential. While reference is made to some case law, the scope of the article 
does not allow for a detailed analysis of these. Some broad principles are 
borne in mind in assessing the effectiveness of the complaints mechanisms. 
An effective complaints mechanism should be able to provide States with 
clear authoritative guidance on the meaning of treaty provisions and the 
obligations, as well as an understanding of SERs in general. It should also be 
able to augment the practical relevance and status of the particular treaty. It 
should further have a broad and flexible approach to standing so as to ensure 
that its use is maximised in a way that facilitates accessibility for the poor and 
marginalised groups. The kind of remedies issued should be concrete, targeted 
and clear so as to facilitate implementation and improve rights enjoyment on 
the ground. An effective mechanism must also be able to address complaints 
within reasonable time, and ensure prompt and effective action in cases where 
violations have occurred. Effectiveness can also be affected by the kind of 
language used in the treaty provisions (for example, the OP-ICESCR has 
been criticised for using weak language that would impact negatively on its 
effectiveness), and whether the mechanism takes into consideration current 
realities17 as seen in the case of the African Commission.
It should be noted that the structure and approach to litigation at the 
international level is different from that at the national level. For instance, 
at the international level, human rights litigation is before quasi-judicial and 
judicial mechanisms. The complaints mechanisms of treaty bodies fall under 
the former. Quasi-judicial complaints mechanisms differ from judicial or court 
proceedings in that they are seen as “a distinctive form of adjudication”.18 
It involves a body of independent experts (not necessarily having a legal 
background) that decides a claim of violation by applying international human 
rights norms and then makes its decision with recommendations on appropriate 
remedies for a violation, which are then transmitted to the parties. Generally, 
there are no oral proceedings and individual complaints are considered in 
17 See A Vandenbogaerde & W Vandenhole “The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Ex Ante Assessment of its Effectiveness in Light of the Drafting 
Process” (2010) 10 HRLR 207 207-237, where it is stated that potential effectiveness is jeopardised by 
weak wording since a weak procedure is unlikely to be able to adequately respond to violations of rights  
The authors also state that “[a] potentially effective mechanism is one that is attuned to the specificity 
of [socio-economic] rights and to current realities, rather than to the prejudices that have compromised 
[these] rights” (237)
18 K Mechlem “Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights” (2009) 42 Vand J Transnat’l L 905 
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closed sessions.19 Another difference between international and national 
litigation processes relates to the question of access to the mechanisms. While 
national courts adopt a very broad approach to access (granting everyone 
access and State consent is not required), access to international mechanisms 
is restricted by a number of factors including whether a State is a party to 
the mechanism’s constitutive treaty and/or has recognised the competence of 
the relevant body to receive complaints. The question of access is discussed 
further in this article when dealing with standing in relation to quasi-judicial 
bodies and also in the discussion on the African Court, which highlights other 
factors that impact on access.
2  Quasi-judicial mechanisms: The OP-ICESCR and the African 
Commission
2 1  Overview
Before considering the four aspects – standing; admissibility criteria; 
standard of reviewing State compliance; and remedies and enforcement – of the 
complaints mechanisms under the OP-ICESCR and the African Commission, 
a brief overview of quasi-judicial mechanisms at the UN and regional 
levels is relevant for two reasons. First, it would place the OP-ICESCR and 
the African Commission mechanisms in context. Second, it would provide 
further understanding of the structure and approach to international litigation 
processes under quasi-judicial mechanisms.
As regards the UN system, treaty-based quasi-judicial mechanisms 
for litigating rights have been established by:20 the ICCPR; the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 
(“OP-ICCPR”);21 the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965 (“CERD”);22 the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1984 (“CAT”);23 the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990 (“CRMW”);24 the Optional 
Protocol to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
19 Regional mechanisms, such as that of the African Commission, allow oral representation  See Rule 99 
of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2010) (“African 
Commission Rules of Procedure”)  See also R Murray “Decisions by the African Commission on 
Individual Communications under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (1997) 46 Int’l & 
Comp LQ 412 427  Also, in order to enhance the complaints procedure under the OP-ICCPR, the use of 
oral hearings has been encouraged  See H Steiner, P Alston & R Goodmand International Human Rights 
in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 3 ed (2007) 895
20 At the time of writing, an optional complaints mechanism for the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989) UN Doc A/44/49 (“CRC”) had been adopted by the Human Rights Council and transmitted to the 
UN General Assembly for adoption
21 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) UN Doc A/6316 
(“OP-ICCPR”)  See also art 41 of the ICCPR  
22 Art 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) 
UN Doc A/6014 (“CERD”)  
23 Art 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984) UN Doc A/39/51 (“CAT”)
24 Arts 76 and 77 of the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families (1990) UN Doc A/45/49 (“CRMW”)  This mechanism requires ten declarations from 
States accepting the mechanism in order for it to enter into force
686 STELL LR 2011 3
       
of Discrimination against Women, 1999 (“OP-CEDAW”);25 the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006 
(“OP-CRPD”);26 the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 2006 (“CPED”);27 and the OP-ICESCR. 
With the exception of the OP-ICESCR, whose scope extends to all economic, 
social and cultural rights, the scope of the other mechanisms are limited to 
some SERs or the rights of certain groups. The mechanisms further provide 
for both individual28 and inter-State29 complaints mechanisms. However, 
some of the mechanisms or procedures require States to either opt-in or opt-
out. That is, a State has to make a declaration upon ratification or subsequently, 
recognising (opt-in) or not recognising (opt-out) the competence of the relevant 
committee to receive and consider complaints under specific procedures. The 
opt-in approach is adopted in the case of the complaints mechanism under 
the CAT, the CRMW, and the CPED; the inter-State procedures under the 
ICCPR and OP-ICESCR; and the individual complaints procedures under 
CERD. The OP-CRDP adopts an opt-out approach for individual and inter-
State complaints.
The OP-ICESCR is consistent with existing UN complaints mechanisms as 
it allows for the possibility of interim measures in exceptional circumstances 
in order to prevent irreparable damage to victims is provided for.30 This 
is one of the most important functions of any judicial or quasi-judicial 
body adjudicating complaints, as it ensures such body’s effectiveness. The 
practical challenge would be to get States to comply with a request to take 
interim measures, since many States are yet to accept that interim measures 
specified by international quasi-judicial bodies are binding on them.31 The 
OP-ICESCR also allows for the friendly settlement of disputes.32 The UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) is further 
empowered to conduct inquiries into grave or systematic violations of SERs, 
based on reliable information it receives, which is an opt-in procedure.33 The 
initiation of the inquiry is at the discretion of the Committee and not based on 
25 Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (1999) UN Doc A/54/49 (Vol I) (“OP-CEDAW”)  The main treaty being the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) UN Doc A/34/46 
(“CEDAW”)  
26 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (2006) UN Doc A/61/49 
(“OP-CRPD”)  The main treaty being the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2006) UN Doc A/61/49 (“CRPD”)
27 Arts 31 and 32 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/177 (“CPED”)  
28 Complaints brought by individuals or groups of individuals or by others on their behalf
29 Complaints brought by a State against another State, relating to a failure to meet obligations under the 
applicable treaty  The OP-CRPD is silent on inter-State complaints
30 Art 5 of the OP-ICESCR
31 J Pasqualucci “Interim Measures in International Human Rights: Evolution and Harmonization” (2005) 
38 Vand J Transnat’l L 1 2  See also F Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) 326-329, 
which illustrates States’ uniform disregard for interim measures made by the African Commission
32 Art 7 of the OP-ICESCR
33 Arts 10-11 of the OP-ICESCR
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the receipt of a formal complaint.34 This is therefore useful in instances where 
individuals are precluded or prevented by circumstances beyond their control 
to submit a complaint.
Pending the entry into force of the OP-ICESCR, the Human Rights 
Committee established under the ICCPR is seen as “the most important forum 
for the further evolution of jurisprudence in respect of equality and non-
discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights”.35 
The Committee has interpreted article 26 of the ICCPR – on equality and 
non-discrimination – not only as an independent right, but also as a right 
that is applicable to the rights in the ICESCR. It has found a violation of 
this provision regarding access to social security rights,36 the right to work 
and right to property; and has also addressed issues relating to the rights to 
education, health, reproductive rights and the right to culture.37 Similarly, 
the CERD Committee has found a breach of the right to equality in relation 
to the right to housing.38 The CEDAW Committee has also found a State 
in breach of its obligation to provide information and obtain full consent for 
reproductive health procedures.39 While these decisions are commendable, 
their scope is restrictive in that it addresses SERs through the equality lens 
only, or as it relates to women. Hence the need for a separate individual 
complaints mechanism specifically for SERs that deals with all its dimensions 
and assesses its implementation from various lenses.
At the African regional level, the African Commission’s complaints 
mechanism has been used in the litigation of SERs contained in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 (“African Charter”),40 and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa, 2003 (“African Women’s Protocol”).41 Children’s SERs 
in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 (“African 
34 The inquiry and inter-State mechanisms can be used to draw attention to issues relating to extra-territorial 
violations of rights in the ICESCR  See C Courtis & M Sepúlveda “Are Extra-territorial Obligations 
Reviewable under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR?” (2009) 27 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 54 
61
35 M Scheinin “Human Rights Committee: Not only a Committee on Civil and Political Rights” in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(2008) 540 552  See also M Scheinin “Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights” in A Eide, C Krause 
& A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook 2 ed (2001) 29 32-34, in relation to 
cases in which provisions of the ICCPR such as equality and non-discrimination have been used to protect 
socio-economic rights  
36 See, for example, Young v Australia Communication 941/2000 UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000; 
Gueye et al v France Communication 196/1985 UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985; Zwaan de Vries v 
the Netherlands Communication 182/1984 UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/42/40) 160  See also Broeks v The 
Netherlands Communication 172/1984 UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 196
37 See Scheinin “Human Rights Committee” in Social Rights Jurisprudence 540-552; Scheinin “Economic 
and Social Rights” in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 32-34; A Rosas & M Scheinin “Implementation 
Mechanisms and Remedies” in A Eide, C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
A Textbook 2 ed (2001) 425 440-441
38 L.R. et al v Slovakia Communication 31/2003 UN Doc CERD/C/66/D/31/2003
39 A.S. v Hungary Communication 4/2004 UN Doc CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004
40 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 rev  5 (“African 
Charter”)
41 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003) 
OAU Doc CAB/LEG/66 6 (“African Women’s Protocol”)
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Children’s Charter”)42 can be litigated through the complaints mechanism of 
the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(“African Committee on Children’s Rights”).43
In contrast with the OP-ICESCR, there is no provision in the African 
Charter requiring the African Commission resorting to the friendly 
settlement of disputes or to adoption of provisional measures in the case of 
individual complaints. However, the power to make provisional measures is 
contained in its African Commission Rules of Procedure;44 and in practice, 
the Commission has occasionally resorted to the amicable settlement of 
disputes.45 The Rules of Procedure go a step further than article 5 of the 
OP-ICESCR by including a follow-up mechanism for provisional measures; 
and where there is non-compliance, the Commission can refer the case to the 
African Court.46 As mentioned earlier, the ability to prescribe provisional 
measures is one of the most important functions of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
body adjudicating rights claims. For such a body to be effective, it should be 
able to perform a pre-emptive function – that is, stop harm before it can occur, 
stop an ongoing harm from continuing, or at least mitigate the effects of that 
harm.47 The inclusion of the friendly settlement of disputes mechanism is 
important because friendly settlement is a general principle of international 
law.
Since the African Court is still in its early years, and undergoing structural 
changes as noted earlier and explained further subsequently in this article, 
the African Commission remains the principal body through which SERs can 
be litigated.48 The African Commission has dealt substantively with SERs 
in a few cases.49 The decisions provide some guidance on the obligations 
and substantive content of the rights in the African Charter, including 
augmenting the explicit rights in it. The Commission also made extensive 
recommendations in the cases, which would have far reaching implications 
for the poor if implemented effectively.
The most notable case is Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria50 (“SERAC”), in which the 
Commission found the Nigerian government to be in violation of the rights to 
health, food, housing and environmental rights, among others. It is the first 
42 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24 9/49 (“African 
Children’s Charter”)
43 At the time of writing, the Committee was finalising its first decision in the case of Nubian Children in 
Kenya v Kenya Communication 002/2009
44 Rule 98 of the African Commission Rules of Procedure
45 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 329
46 Rule 118(2) of the African Commission Rules of Procedure
47 Chenwi (2009) AHRLJ 37
48 For the steps in the litigation process, see SM Weldehaimanor “Towards Speedy Trials: Reforming the 
Practice of Adjudicating Cases in the African Human Rights System” (2010) 1 University for Peace LR 
14 19-21
49 In addition to the cases below, the Commission has found violations of specific socio-economic rights in 
Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania Communications 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97-196/97 
and 210/98 (2000) AHRLR 146; Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v Zaire Communications 25/89, 
47/90, 56/91, 100/93 (2000) AHRLR 74
50 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60
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case in which the Commission delineated the negative and positive obligations 
of States in relation to SERs in the African Charter. The Commission also 
read some missing rights – food and housing, including the prohibition against 
forced eviction – into the African Charter.
In Purohit and Moore v The Gambia51 (“Purohit”), while finding a 
violation of the right to health, among others, the Commission fleshed out 
its substantive content. The Commission took into account African realities 
in defining the SERs obligation of States. In particular, the Commission 
considered the fact that “millions of people in Africa are not enjoying the 
right to health maximally because African countries are generally faced 
with the problem of poverty which renders them incapable to provide the 
necessary amenities, infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full 
enjoyment of this right”.52
Based on this “depressing but real state of affairs”, the Commission read 
into the relevant provision “the obligation on part of States party to the African 
Charter to take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full advantage of its 
available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in all its 
aspects without discrimination of any kind”.53
The Commission, with reference to a previous decision, read the right to 
water into the African Charter in Sudan Human Rights Organisation v The 
Sudan Communication 279/03 and Centre on Human Rights and Evictions v 
The Sudan54 (“Sudan”). This decision speaks to the indivisibility of human 
rights and advances SERs such as housing, food, water and health, as well 
as the need for effective domestic remedies. The Commission elaborated 
on the right to property,55 the prohibition on forced eviction,56 and the 
right of peoples to their economic, social and cultural development.57 In 
its most recent case, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council 
v Kenya58 (“Endorois”), the Commission for the first time recognised the 
rights of indigenous peoples to own land and to development. This case 
is important in its elaboration of the right to development. It also places 
emphasis on empowerment, better processes, respecting the agency of all 
individuals and improving their capabilities and choices in the realisation 
of rights. The decision further emphasised the need for States to give an 
equivalent degree of constitutional protection to civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights.
51 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96  
52 Para 84
53 Para 84
54 Sudan Human Rights Organisation v The Sudan Communication 279/03 and Centre on Human Rights 
and Evictions v The Sudan Communication 296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153  
55 See paras 191-205
56 See, for example, paras 177, 186-189 and 216
57 See paras 217-224
58 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication 276/2003 (2010)  
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2 2  Some key aspects
2 2 1  Standing
Standing is an unqualified pre-condition to all legal actions and is different 
from admissibility. Standing refers to the “‘right to appear as a party’ before 
a judicial tribunal or quasi-judicial body”, while admissibility relates to the 
substantive basis of a claim.59
The mechanisms under the OP-ICESCR and the African Commission 
recognise standing for victims, the representatives of victims, and third 
parties acting on behalf of victims with or without their consent.60 Where 
consent has not been obtained, the author has to justify why it is acting without 
such consent. With regard to others submitting on behalf of victims, the 
OP-ICESCR is not clear on whether or not an organisation or institution acting 
on behalf of victims must have consultative status with the UN Economic and 
Social Council. The position under the African Commission mechanism is 
clear. A non-governmental organisation (“NGO”) for instance, need not have 
observer status with the Commission, the author need not be a national or be 
registered in the territory of the State concerned, and there is no requirement 
on the author to be African, be based in an African State, or to be composed of 
people of African origin. However, what is clear in relation to the OP-ICESCR 
is that NGOs cannot submit a complaint in the public interest, as they have to 
act on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals.61
The OP-ICESCR can be contrasted with the African Commission mechanism 
in this regard. The African Commission has adopted a generous approach to 
standing. In addition to allowing individuals, groups of individuals or NGOs, 
the African Commission has allowed the submission of a complaint in the 
public interest. The SERAC case is instructive in this regard. The Commission 
in this case thanked the two NGOs that had brought the case, stating that it “is 
a demonstration of the usefulness to the Commission and individuals of actio 
popularis, which is wisely allowed under the African Charter”.62
2 2 2  Admissibility criteria
Complaints can only be received and considered if they meet certain 
admissibility criteria. Key among the criteria is that all available domestic 
remedies – judicial and administrative – must have been exhausted. This 
requirement is based on the principle that the full and effective implementation 
of international human rights obligations is intended to improve the enjoyment 
of rights at the national level.63 When taking a case to UN bodies, the 
exhaustion of regional remedies is not part of this requirement. This ensures 
59 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 323
60 Art 2 of the OP-ICESCR  This is also the position of the African Commission  A victim is different from 
the author of a complaint, as the person submitting a compliant does not have to be the victim
61 The OP-ICESCR does not include “collective complaints” as used in the European System  
62 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 para 49
63 NJ Udombana “So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2003) 97 Am J Int’l L 1 9
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that a hierarchy is not established between the UN and regional mechanisms, 
especially because regional mechanisms ordinarily play a complementary role 
to UN mechanisms rather than provide a basis for denying complaints from 
regions where regional remedies are available. Moreover, regional mechanisms 
are better placed to take into account a State’s level of development and 
regional specificities. This is not to say that the UN mechanisms would not 
consider regional specificities if they are aware of it or if placed before them.
Since a remedy should be available (that is, it can be used without 
impediment), effective (that is, it should offer a prospect of success) and 
sufficient (that is, it is capable of redressing the wrong complaint about),64 
exceptions to the rule exists. The particular circumstance of a case is relevant 
in any determination of whether domestic remedies are in fact available. In 
the Sudan case, for example, it was impossible to bring issues of human rights 
violations before independent and impartial courts since the State was under a 
military regime resulting in intimidation, threats and harassment when a case 
was brought.65 Displacements into remote regions also made it impossible 
for people to avail themselves of any remedies.66 The African Commission, 
while finding the case to be admissible, stated that “the scale and nature of the 
alleged abuses, the number of persons involved ipso facto make local remedies 
unavailable, ineffective and insufficient”.67
Since this case involved a large number of people – in fact tens of 
thousands who had been forcibly evicted and their properties destroyed –the 
Commission found it impracticable and undesirable to expect them to exhaust 
local remedies that were in any case ineffective.68 The African Commission 
has interpreted the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies substantively, 
identifying instances where local remedies would be non-existent.69
In addition, complaints must be submitted within a specific time frame 
following the exhaustion of domestic remedies. While the OP-ICESCR 
stipulates a one-year time frame (with room for justifiable exceptions),70 the 
African Commission is more flexible in its approach, as complaints have to 
be submitted “within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are 
exhausted”.71 This implies that establishing what amounts to a reasonable 
time is done on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. In this regard, the African system is 
acclaimed for its “responsiveness to the African landscape’s fluidity rather 
than an adherence to inflexible time standards”.72 Other admissibility grounds 
64 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 336
65 Sudan Human Rights Organisation v The Sudan Communication 279/03 and Centre on Human Rights 




69 See Udombana (2003) Am J Int’l L 1-37; F Viljoen “Admissibility under the African Charter” in M Evans 
& R Murray (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-
2000 (2002) 61 81-99; Viljoen International Human Rights Law 331-340
70 Art 3(2)(a) of the OP-ICESCR
71 See art 56(6) of the African Charter
72 Viljoen International Human Rights Law 339
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common to the OP-ICESCR and African Commission are contained in article 
3(2)(b)-(g) of the OP-ICESCR and article 56 of the African Charter.
A novel requirement, absent in the African Commission mechanism 
but included in the OP-ICESCR, is the discretion given to the CESCR to 
“decline to consider a communication where it does not reveal that the author 
has suffered a clear disadvantage, unless the Committee considers that the 
communication raises a serious issue of general importance”.73 The provision 
adds a threshold that would allow the CESCR not to deal with complaints of 
minor importance and to prevent a flood of cases. However, caution would 
have to be used in applying this provision so as not to eliminate cases that do 
not on the face of it reflect serious violations, which would otherwise have 
been considered. Caution is important because, as noted by Vandenbogaerde 
and Vandenhole, it is only at the merits stage that the substantive issues of a 
case can be adequately investigated. They also state that adding admissibility 
requirements reduces potential effectiveness since this implies additional 
hurdles of a procedural nature before the substance of a complaint can be 
examined.74
2 2 3  Standard of review
The standard of reviewing State compliance with its obligations is clearer 
under the OP-ICESCR than under the African Commission mechanism. 
Consistent with both international and domestic standards of review in the field 
of SERs, the standard to be applied under the OP-ICESCR when considering 
complaints and in assessing State compliance is that of reasonableness.75 
The African Commission has also referred to reasonable steps but with very 
limited elaboration on what it means.
As rightly observed by Porter, the wording of the relevant provision in 
the OP-ICESCR is derived from the South African Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence.76 In fact, during the negotiations of the OP-ICESCR, the way 
in which courts in various systems, including South Africa, have approached 
the question of enforcement of SERs was considered. The interpretation and 
application of the reasonableness standard, as Porter has observed, is at the 
core of the effectiveness of the OP-ICESCR in providing relief to litigants.77 He 
73 Art 4 of the OP-ICESCR  See also Scheinin & Langford (2009) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 110, 
where the importance of the CESCR adopting such an approach is stated with reference to the Human 
Rights Committee’s experience
74 Vandenbogaerde & Vandenhole (2010) HRLR 235
75 Art 8(4) of the OP-ICESCR  For the various instances in which the concept of reasonableness has been 
used, see UNHRC Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights The Use of the Reasonableness’ Test in Assessing Compliance with 
International Human Rights Obligations (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/WG 4/CRP 1  
76 B Porter “The Reasonableness of Article 8(4): Adjudicating Claims from the Margins” (2009) 27 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 39 49-51, which also explains what the reasonableness standard in the 
OP-ICESCR means  The South African Constitutional Court first developed the reasonableness standard 
in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) para 41, which it 
now applies in assessing the State’s compliance with its obligation to take steps towards realising socio-
economic rights  See also L Chenwi “Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African Judicial Enforcement 
of the Right to Adequate Housing of Those Subject to Evictions” (2008) 8 HRLR 105 119, where the South 
African reasonableness standard is discussed
77 Porter (2009) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 40
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goes further to describe it as a “double edged sword”.78 From one standpoint, 
it can be used to deny adequate adjudication of, or effective remedies for, 
substantive SERs claims based on the margin of discretion accorded to States. 
From another standpoint, it can be used to respond to challenges that go to the 
systemic causes of poverty and exclusion. Since the OP-ICESCR is not yet in 
force, there is no jurisprudence from the CESCR on this standard of review. 
However, the Committee has identified a number of factors (which are not 
exhaustive) that it would take into account in assessing States’ compliance 
with their obligations under the ICESCR, as well as to determine whether the 
measures they have taken are adequate or reasonable. The factors identified by 
the Committee were the following: measures taken must be deliberate, concrete 
and targeted; the State must exercise its discretion in a non-discriminatory 
and non-arbitrary manner; whether decisions relating to resources accord with 
international human rights standards; whether the policy option adopted is the 
one that least restricts rights; the time frame within which the measures were 
taken; and whether the situation of the disadvantaged and marginalised has 
been taken into account and priority given to grave situations or situations of 
risk.79 The reasonableness standard in the OP-ICESCR therefore acknowledges 
the institutional roles and limitations in giving effect to the right to effective 
remedies. Where States use resource constraints as an excuse for a retrogressive 
step taken, the Committee has indicated other factors that it would take into 
account in its assessment.80 Furthermore, importance is placed on transparent 
and participative decision-making processes at the national level.81
It should be noted that the reasonableness standard (as is the case in 
the South African context) has not been without challenges, including 
placing a heavy burden on the claimants to prove the unreasonableness 
of measures.82 Accordingly, a number of suggestions have been made in 
relation to strengthening the standard under the OP-ICESCR. These include 
the need, in applying the standard, to ensure that the voice of rights claimants 
are adequately heard, that appropriate and effective remedies are fashioned 
taking into consideration the needs and context of claimants and the purpose 
of the OP-ICESCR, and that the standard be interpreted as a recognition of 
the multiplicity of entitlements and actors that are involved in allegations of 
SERs violations.83
The African Commission’s jurisprudence does not provide much clarity 
as regards the standard it applies. In SERAC, the Commission referred to the 
State’s obligation to “take reasonable and other measures” in relation to the 
78 40
79 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps 




82 See S Liebenberg “South Africa: Adjudicating Social Rights under a Transformative Constitution” in 
M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(2008) 75 89-91, where the challenges in the South African context are highlighted
83 Porter (2009) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 52-53
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right to a satisfactory (or healthy) environment favourable to development,84 
but failed to elaborate on what constitutes reasonable steps. Subsequently, in 
Purohit, the Commission read into the right to health in the African Charter, 
an obligation on States to “take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full 
advantage of its available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully 
realised in all its aspects without discrimination of any kind”.85
Again, it failed to link this to the “reasonable measures” in SERAC or to 
national jurisprudence that applies the reasonableness concept. Questions 
such as whether “concrete and target steps” should be considered within 
South Africa’s reasonableness concept or within the CESCR’s interpretation, 
or whether State obligations should be discharged as a matter of priority 
where resources are lacking, have therefore been left unanswered in the 
Commission’s decisions.86
In Endorois, the African Commission stated that the State bears the burden 
of proving that a measure it has adopted is reasonable.87 This would be 
useful to poor litigants who lack the resources to prove unreasonableness. The 
Commission also acknowledged the need for measures adopted to be based 
on objective and reasonable grounds, and based on equality88 But again, the 
Commission made these statements without linking them to its previous SERs 
jurisprudence. However, the case is illustrative of the importance attached 
by the Commission to the participation of beneficiaries in the planning and 
implementation of measures that affect them. This is in line with the standard 
that the CESCR intends to apply, which also speaks to participative decision-
making.
Furthermore, the Commission in Endorois engaged in a proportionality 
analysis, with reference to its previous jurisprudence and that of the Human 
Rights Committee. The Commission acknowledged that it may be necessary in 
some instances to place some form of limited restrictions on a right protected 
by the African Charter.89 However, such restrictions must be established by 
law, not be applied in a manner that would completely vitiate the right, be 
applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed, be directly 
related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated, be 
based on exceptionally good reasons, and not be negligible.90 In the Sudan 
case as well, the Commission held that restrictions on the enjoyment of rights 
should be proportionate and necessary to respond to a specific public need or 
84 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 para 52 (emphasis added)
85 Para 84 (emphasis added)
86 DM Chirwa “African Regional Level: The Promise of Recent Jurisprudence on Social Rights” in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law 
(2008) 323 326-327
87 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication 276/2003 (2010) para 172
88 Para 234  See also paras 227, 228, 296
89 Para 172
90 Para 172
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pursue a legitimate aim.91 The burden is again on the State to prove that an 
interference with a right is proportionate.92
The Commission has further made statements that imply its acknowledgement 
of the minimum core approach. In SERAC, for example, the Commission 
stated that
“the minimum core of the right to food requires that the Nigerian Government should not destroy or 
contaminate food sources. It should not allow private parties to destroy or contaminate food sources, 
and prevent peoples’ efforts to feed themselves”.93
It then found the Government to be in breach of its minimum duties of the 
right to food.94 However, Chirwa has criticised the statements in SERAC as 
not reflecting an understanding of the minimum core approach as developed 
by the CESCR. It is rather, as he states, a misunderstanding of the concept as 
the pronouncements speak to the duty to respect as opposed to the government 
taking positive measures to satisfy minimum essential levels of the right.95 
Notwithstanding, it is evident from its jurisprudence and standards on SERs 
that the Commission recognise the minimum core approach as applicable to 
these rights in the African Charter.96
2 2 4  Remedies and enforcement
The OP-ICESCR does not explicitly refer to remedies. It states that the 
CESCR shall transmit its views (decision) together with recommendations to 
the State party after the consideration of a complaint.97 However, the CESCR 
has identified the following remedies that it could issue: compensation; 
requesting the State to remedy the violation; suggesting a range of measures 
to be adopted; or recommending a follow-up mechanism to ensure on-going 
accountability of the State.98
Similarly, the African Charter does not explicitly recognise the African 
Commission’s role in granting remedies. Notwithstanding this, the 
Commission has issued remedies, some of which are open-ended, such as 
requesting a State to bring its laws in line with the African Charter. This is 
problematic in that it does not spell out what the State is supposed to do or 
shed light on the entitlements of the claimant. In other instances, relatively 
clear and targeted or detailed remedies have been issued. For example, 
requesting a State: to rehabilitate economic and social infrastructure, such 
91 Sudan Human Rights Organisation v The Sudan Communication 279/03 and Centre on Human Rights 
and Evictions v The Sudan Communication 296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153 para 188
92 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication 276/2003 (2010) para 172
93 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 para 65  See also para 61 on the right to housing
94 Para 66
95 Chirwa “African Regional Level” in Social Rights Jurisprudence 325-326
96 See the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (formally launched in October 2011)  
97 Art 9 of the OP-ICESCR
98 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps 
para 13
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as education, health, water, and agricultural services, and to resolve issues 
of water rights;99 to repeal the challenged law and adopt a new legislative 
regime, create an expert body to review the cases of all persons detained 
under challenged legislation, provide adequate medical and material care for 
persons suffering from mental health problems;100 to investigate violations 
and provide adequate compensation, including relief and resettlement;101 and 
to provide compensation for loss suffered and restitution of land.102
However, enforcement of the decisions of treaty bodies is a challenge, as 
their decisions are not binding. Their implementation is therefore largely 
dependent on political will. Accordingly, follow-up mechanisms are relevant 
in ensuring implementation of the decisions. Follow-up is also a means of 
assessing direct impact of decisions. With regard to follow-up mechanisms, 
the OP-ICESCR requires States to submit to the CESCR, within six months, 
a written response to its views and recommendations.103 The State may also 
be invited to submit further information on any measures taken in response 
to the views or recommendations in its subsequent State report under the 
ICESCR.104 This follow-up mechanism provides an opportunity for the 
CESCR to become aware of and address problems encountered by the State 
when implementing its views and recommendations, so as to ensure their 
effective implementation. This follow-up mechanism is similar to that of other 
treaty bodies. For instance, the Human Rights Committee requires States to 
reply within a period not exceeding 180 days; in practice, it usually indicates 
a period of 90 days.105 The difference, however, is that the requirement under 
the OP-ICESCR is explicitly stated in the treaty.
Compliance with the CESCR’s decisions can also be facilitated through 
article 14 of the OP-ICESCR. It requires the Committee to transmit, when 
appropriate and with the consent of the State party, to UN specialised 
agencies, funds and programmes and other competent bodies, its views and 
recommendations concerning communications and inquiries that indicate a 
need for technical advice or assistance.106 The CESCR can also bring to the 
attention of these bodies “the advisability of international measures likely to 
contribute to assisting States Parties in achieving progress in implementation 
of the rights [recognised] in the Covenant”.107
99 Sudan Human Rights Organisation v The Sudan Communication 279/03 and Centre on Human Rights 
and Evictions v The Sudan Communication 296/05 (2009) AHRLR 153 para 229
100 See Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 110  
101 See Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 para 71
102 See Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf 
of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication 276/2003 (2010) Recommendation 1(a) and (c)
103 See art 9(2) of the OP-ICESCR
104 See art 9(3) of the OP-ICESCR
105 E de Wet “Recent Developments Concerning the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1997) 13 SAJHR 514 514
106 Art 14(1) of the OP-ICESCR  The OP-ICESCR also provides for the establishment of a fund in order to 
facilitate international assistance and cooperation, through which States can receive expert and technical, 
as opposed to financial, assistance (art 14(3))
107 Art 14(2) of the OP-ICESCR
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With regard to the African Commission, the impact of its decisions has been 
limited by the lack of a mechanism to monitor implementation. Therefore, 
follow-ups to its decisions have for the main part been very limited, with 
the State reporting procedure being the main avenue used. This has been 
exacerbated by the lack of political will of States to implement its decisions, 
which further erodes the Commission’s credibility.
The Commission has explicitly, though mainly in very weak language, 
required States to report back on implementation and failed, in some 
instances, to give a time frame. In SERAC, for example, the Commission 
urged the Nigerian government to keep it informed;108 and in Purohit, 
it went a step further to require the Gambian government to include in its 
next periodic report, measures taken to comply with its recommendations 
and directions.109 The Commission adopted a more stringent stance in 
line with its 2006 resolution in the Endorois case, requiring the Kenyan 
government to engage in dialogue with the complainants for the effective 
implementation of its recommendations and to report within three months 
on their implementation.110 The Commission further avail its good offices to 
assist the parties in the implementation of the recommendations.111
In 2006, in order to strengthen the implementation of its recommendations, 
the Commission adopted a resolution requiring States to “respect without 
delay the recommendation of the Commission”; “submit at every session of 
the Executive Council a report on the situation of the compliance with its 
recommendations”; and to indicate within 90 days of being notified of the 
recommendations, “the measures taken and/or the obstacles in implementing 
the recommendations”.112 The African Commission has incorporated this 
follow-up mechanism in its Rules of Procedure, but extended the number 
of days within which a State should respond after being notified of the 
recommendation to 180 days.113 Also, the Commission may request further 
information on measures taken in response to its decision, within 90 days of 
receipt of the State’s written response.114 In situations of non-compliance, 
the Commission can bring the case to the attention of the Sub-Committee of 
the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Executive Council on the 
Implementation of the Decisions of the African Union;115 or submit it to the 
African Court.116 Despite the adoption of the follow-up mechanism in 2006, 
implementation of decisions is still to be improved.
108 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication 155/96 (2001) AHRLR 60 para 72
109 Purohit and Moore v The Gambia Communication 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 110
110 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya Communication 276/2003 (2010) Recommendation 1(g)
111 Recommendation 2  
112 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution on the Importance of the Implementation 
of the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights by States Parties 
(2006) ACHPR/Res.97(XXXX)06 <http://www achpr org/english/resolutions/resolution102_en html> 
(accessed 17-06-2011)  
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3  Judicial mechanisms: The African Court
This section focuses on the judicial mechanisms at the African regional 
level. A consideration of the judicial mechanisms in the European and Inter-
American regional systems is beyond the scope of this paper.
In 1998, a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“African Court Protocol”)117 was adopted – establishing and empowering the 
African Court to, among other things, consider violations of human rights. 
The judicial mechanisms were initially constituted as two separate courts – 
the African Court to deal with allegations of human rights violations, and 
the African Court of Justice118 to deal with issues of a political and economic 
nature. However, due to the possibility of overlap and concerns around 
institutional redundancy, as well as a desire to alleviate financial resources 
constraints,119 a decision was taken in 2004 to integrate both courts into a 
single court. The overlap in competence and jurisdiction can be seen from 
the following: The African Court of Justice has jurisdiction over disputes 
and applications that relate to, among other things, the interpretation and 
application of treaties and subsidiary instruments of the African Union (AU), 
and public international law.120 The African Court also deals with disputes 
regarding interpretation and application of AU treaties, among others.121 
Therefore, the conflict of jurisdiction has been seen as one of the overlaps 
that the merger would address.122 Consequently, in 2008, a Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was adopted (“2008 
Protocol”), invalidating the 1998 and 2003 Protocols.123 However, the African 
Court Protocol remains valid until the 2008 Protocol comes into force, and 
following that, for a transitional period not exceeding one year or any other 
period determined by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of 
the AU.124 The joint court consists of a General Affairs Section and a Human 
and Peoples’ Rights Section;125 and once the joint court is in operation, it 
would take over cases that were pending before the African Court.126
117 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998) OAU Doc OAU/LEG/ExP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (“African Court 
Protocol”)
118 See Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union (2003) AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec 45 (111) 
(“2003 Protocol”)
119 A Zimmermann & J Bäumler “Current Challenges facing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights” (2010) 7 KAS International Reports 38 48-49  See also GM Wachira (Minority Rights Group 
International) African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Ten Years On and Still No Justice (2008) 
14
120 Art 19 of the 2003 Protocol
121 Art 3 of the African Court Protocol
122 African Legal Aid Introducing the New African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Narrative Report 
(2006) 13
123 See art 1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2008) AU Doc 
Assembly/AU/Dec 196 (xI) (“2008 Protocol”)
124 Art 7 of the 2008 Protocol
125 Art 16 of the 2008 Protocol  At the time of writing, discussions on amendments to the 2008 Protocol were 
underway in order to create a third section to the joint court – the International Criminal Law Section
126 Art 5 of the 2008 Protocol
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The African Court can consider both individual and inter-State complaints; 
and is also empowered to give advisory opinions on any legal matter relating to 
the African Charter or other relevant human rights instruments, provided that 
the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the 
Commission.127 However, direct access to the Court is limited to the African 
Commission, the applicant and respondent States, the State of the victim of 
the human rights violation, and African Intergovernmental Organisations.128 
While NGOs with observer status before the African Commission and 
individuals can also have access, this is subject to the relevant State making 
a declaration upon ratification or thereafter recognising the competence of 
the Court to receive complaints from these groups.129 Though access for 
individuals and NGOs is subject to a State making the necessary declaration, 
the Court still has the discretion to decide on whether or not to consider the 
case, for example, if it does not meet other jurisdictional grounds.
Though there is the possibility of individual complainants accessing the 
Court through the African Commission,130 restricting standing for NGOs and 
individuals is in fact a setback. The African Charter, as seen above, does 
not contain such restrictions and the African Commission has adopted a 
generous approach to standing. Therefore, the use of litigation, in the context 
of the African Court, by marginalised groups and peoples living in poverty 
to access their rights will be further restricted. There is already a restriction 
in the sense that States have to first become a party to the Court’s constitutive 
treaty. In addition to that, the State party must enter a declaration allowing 
individuals to bring a case before the Court. As a result, the first case that 
came before the Court was dismissed on the basis that the Court had no 
jurisdiction because Senegal had not made the necessary declaration granting 
standing to individuals.131
Concerning the African Court’s procedure in considering complaints, 
the African Court Protocol does not provide much. However, the Interim 
Rules of Procedure of the Court indicate that the Court would first conduct a 
127 Art 4(1) of the African Court Protocol  Arts 5-6, 8 and 33 of the Protocol, as well as part 4 of the African 
Commission Rules of Procedure, set out this complementarity relationship
128 Art 5(1) of the African Court Protocol
129 Arts 5(3) and 34(6) of the African Court Protocol  This restrictive standing is also contained in art 30(f), 
read with art 8, of the 2008 Protocol  Of the 26 States that have ratified the African Court Protocol, only 
five – Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali and Tanzania – have made such a declaration (see African 
Union “List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 
(11-03-2011) African Union <http://www au int/en/sites/default/files/992achpr pdf> (accessed 17-06-
2011))
130 By virtue of art 5(1)(a) of the African Court Protocol, the African Commission can refer cases it 
receives to the Court; or file cases (as a complainant) based on its own findings, even where the State 
concerned has not made the declaration giving individuals standing before the Court (see also Rule 
118(3) and (4) of the African Commission Rules of Procedure)  However, the Commission is yet to 
identify clear criteria for referring cases to the African Court (see African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights “Communique Final de la 49ème Session Ordinaire de la Commission Africaine des 
Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples qui s’est tenue a Banjul, Gambie du 28 Avril au 12 Mai 2011” (12-
05-2011) African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights para 37 <http://www achpr org/english/
communiques/Final%20Communique_49 pdf> (accessed 17-06-2011), where the Commission requested 
its Secretariat to conduct further research and propose criteria for referral of cases to the African Court, 
for the Commission to consider at its next extraordinary session)
131 See Yogogombaye v Senegal Application 001/2008 (2009) AHRLR 315  
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preliminary examination of its jurisdiction and admissibility before going on 
to consider substantive issues .132
With regard to admissibility, the criteria under the African Charter are 
applicable; and when considering the admissibility of complaints from NGOs 
or individuals, the Court may seek the opinion of the African Commission. The 
African Court may also refer cases to the Commission.133 These provisions 
show the complementarity between the Commission and the Court, which is 
recognised in the Court’s constitutive treaty.134
Conversely, due to the lack of clarity on when one could use the Commission 
or the Court, Steiner, Alston and Goodman have seen the bodies as being in 
competition with each other, without any clear hierarchy, which could result 
in duplication of efforts.135 Looking at other regional systems, the Inter-
American system for example sets a hierarchy between the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
where cases must first go through the latter before they can be brought before 
the former.136
Furthermore, similar to UN and other regional bodies, the Court can try 
to settle a case amicably.137 Similar to the OP-ICESCR, the protection of 
witnesses or persons that appear before the Court is guaranteed.138
A distinguishing point between the Court and UN treaty bodies and the 
African Commission is that the hearings are held in public, and therefore 
presumably includes oral hearings, except where it is necessary to consider 
a complaint in camera.139 This provision is a relief for many who have been 
concerned about the African Commission’s closed hearings. As Udombana 
has pointed out, it ensures that “justice is not only done but manifestly seen 
to be done”.140 Also, free legal representation during hearings is available, 
where the interest of justice so requires.141 However, the provision does not 
say if this extends to the filing of complaints. This would be crucial since one 
of the constraints of the African Commission’s complaints mechanism has 
been the submission of poorly written and unclear cases that may likely allege 
serious violations but are difficult to process due to their format.142
132 Rule 39 of the Interim Rules of Court of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 
and entered into force on 20-06-2008 <http://www chr up ac za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/theme03/
african_court_rules pdf> (accessed 17-06-2011)
133 Art 6 of the African Court Protocol
134 See Rules 114-123 of the African Commission Rules of Procedure
135 Steiner et al International Human Rights in Context 1082
136 See TJ Melish “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity” in M Langford (ed) 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 371 378
137 Art 7 of the African Court Protocol
138 Art 10(3)
139 Art 10(1) and (2)
140 NJ Udombana The African Regional Human Rights Court: Modelling its Rules of Procedure (2002) 
Danish Centre for Human Rights Research Partnership 5/2002 110 <http://www humanrights dk/files/
Importerede%20filer/hr/pdf/udombana_-_african_human_rights_court pdf> (accessed 17-06-2011)
141 Art 10(2) of the African Court Protocol
142 J Harrington “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in M Evans & R Murray (eds) The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000 (2002) 305 324
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The African Court is required to pass its judgment within 90 days after 
hearing a case.143 This addresses a deficiency in the African Commission’s 
mechanism where there is a huge time lapse between the hearing and the 
issuance of a decision in some instances.144 Upon finding a violation, the 
Court can grant remedies, including the payment of fair compensation and 
reparation.145 It can also take provisional (interim) measures proprio motu in 
cases of extreme gravity and urgency in order to avoid irreparable harm.146 
However, the African Court Protocol fails to say if these measures are 
binding as is the case with the Court’s judgments. The Court recently, in its 
second ruling, issued an order for provisional measures in the case of African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya147 (“Libya”). This is the first case brought before it by the 
African Commission. It relates to alleged serious and massive violations, by 
Libyan authorities, of human rights guaranteed under the Charter, including 
the State’s obligation to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to 
the rights and ensure non-discrimination in the enjoyment of rights. Though 
the Commission did not request in its application that the Court should grant 
provisional measures, the Court found it necessary to do so due to an imminent 
risk of loss of life and the difficulties in serving the application on Libya due to 
the ongoing conflict.148 The Libyan authorities were ordered to “immediately 
refrain from any action that would result in loss of life or violation of physical 
integrity of persons, which could be a breach of the provisions of the Charter 
or of other international human rights instruments to which it is a party”.149
The case is does not specifically deal with SERs but deals with rights such as 
non-discrimination and the obligations of States, both of which are relevant to 
SERs. The case is also illustrative of the potential use of provisional measures 
to protect the rights of those who cannot access the Court; of course, subject to 
the measures being implemented. This is particularly important for individuals 
in Libya because Libya has not made the necessary declaration recognising the 
competence of the Court to receive complaints from individuals. Also, though 
implementation of the order is uncertain because of the ongoing conflict in 
Libya, it is significant as it is the first judicial response to the situation in 
Libya and would influence how other bodies and institutions respond to the 
situation.
The implementation of the decisions of the African Court is monitored by 
the Council of Ministers.150 This is reinforced by the undertaking by State 
parties to guarantee the execution of the Court’s decision and to implement 
143 Art 28 of the African Court Protocol
144 Harrington “African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 325
145 Art 27(1) of the African Court Protocol
146 Art 27(2)
147 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Application 004/2011 (2011)
148 Paras 9-13
149 The authorities were also required to report to the Court within fifteen days on the measures taken to 
implement the order (see para 25)
150 Art 29(2) of the African Court Protocol
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them within the time frames stated by the Court.151 This addresses some of 
the deficiencies in the African Charter relating to remedies and follow-up, 
mentioned earlier, which have impacted on the effectiveness of the complaints 
mechanism of the African Commission. The remedial and enforcement powers 
granted to the Court presents better prospects for the protection of SERs, as 
some judgments would require supervision in order to ensure their effective 
implementation.152
4  Concluding remarks
International complaints mechanisms are important in complementing 
domestic mechanisms. The UN High Commission for Human Rights, for 
example, has noted the contribution of UN treaty bodies to the development of 
jurisprudence that is frequently referred to by national and regional tribunals 
and in the provision of individual relief for victims.153 International law 
complaints mechanisms have gone beyond providing justice to individuals 
or groups before it. For example, through the consideration of complaints, 
the African Commission has provided individual relief such as ordering 
compensation, as well as recommended proactive measures to prevent similar 
violations from occurring such as requiring a State to review the relevant 
domestic legislation and monitor institutions providing services.
The OP-ICESCR is not yet in force, so an assessment of its efficacy is 
limited to its potential. Through the consideration of complaints, the CESCR 
would gain more insight into the challenges and limitations in the realisation of 
SERs, enabling it to develop jurisprudence that is sensitive to global realities. 
This would provide a useful framework through which subsequent complaints 
can be analysed and understood.154 However, for it to be effective, a number 
of practical points need to be taken into consideration. Scheinin and Malcolm 
have pointed to the need for the CESCR to make its decisions expansive and 
in-depth in their legal reasoning; and to consider experiences and jurisprudence 
from other jurisdictions or regions so as to refrain from further promoting the 
fragmentation of public international law.155 Langa has, among other things, 
cautioned against the CESCR using too formalistic and technical approaches in 
analysing complaints; and emphasised the importance of the Committee using 
the tools of dignity and equality in addition to reasonableness in upholding 
and enforcing SERs.156 In addition, effective implementation of the decisions 
of the Committee is crucial to ensuring that rights claimants have access to 
remedies and that the decisions have an impact on the ground.
The individual complaints mechanism of the African Commission has 
been instrumental in enforcing and expanding on the SERs in the African 
151 Art 30
152 Chirwa “African Regional Level” in Social Rights Jurisprudence 337
153 UN Human Rights Instruments Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified 
Standing Treaty Body (2006) UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/2 para 13
154 P Langa “Taking Dignity Seriously – Judicial Reflections on the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR” 
(2009) 27 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 29 31
155 Scheinin & Langford (2009) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 111-112
156 Langa (2009) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 37
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Charter, as seen in SERAC, Purohit, Sudan and Endorois, for example, where 
the Commission further developed the substantive content of these rights, 
clarified to some extent the obligations of States, and adopted a progressive 
interpretation of the African Charter and the doctrine of implied rights. 
However, the complaints mechanism of the Commission is not without 
drawbacks, many of them, procedural. While the Commission has been 
commended for developing the individual complaints mechanism into a 
“higher level human rights mechanism”, the need to reform its practice of 
adjudicating cases has also been stressed.157
In addition to the limitation in terms of remedies, the binding nature of 
its decisions and their enforcement, the Commission – as is the case with 
UN treaty bodies – is inaccessible to the poor based on where it is located. 
Complaints also take a long time to be finalised – a problem common to quasi-
judicial treaty bodies. It takes two and a half to three years for a case to be 
disposed of; which is clearly at odds with the notion of a speedy trial.158 This 
has frustrated many, particularly rights claimants. The complaint mechanism 
has therefore been criticised for doing very little to protect an individual 
complainant, “as it ‘starts too late, takes too much time, does not lead to a 
binding results and lacks any effective enforcement’”.159 There is an urgent 
need for an effective complaint procedure that is accessible and relatively 
speedy, and for the rapporteurs of the Commission to be diligent in gathering 
information relating to the facts stated in complaints before it.160
The effectiveness of the African Court becomes relevant in complementing 
the African Commission’s mechanism. In fact, its recent ruling on Libya has 
been seen as a practical example of how “the Commission and the Court 
may cooperate in responding to human rights situations in the region”.161 
Despite the limitations in the African Court Protocol such as taking a step 
back in terms of standing, generally, the Court’s procedure and enforcement 
goes further than that of the Commission. It would therefore be instrumental 
in giving meaning to the SERs in the African Charter and other treaties. 
The initial omission of the Court was in fact seen as undermining public 
confidence in the African human rights system, since its absence made it 
impossible to compel violating States to conform to international norms and 
to provide remedies to victims.162 Whether in practice the Court would be a 
more powerful and structured body than the Commission remains to be seen; 
this would depend on the aptitude, boldness and creativity of the judges. It 
would seem the Court is moving towards this direction if one considers its 
recent order of provisional measures that indicate that the Court is taking 
157 Weldehaimanor (2010) University for Peace LR 19
158 18  
159 Udombana African Regional Human Rights Court 19
160 Udombana (2003) Am J Int’l L 36-37  Weldehaimanor (2010) University for Peace LR 27-19 also makes a 
number of useful suggestions relating to reforming the adjudication mechanism
161 AA Mulugeta “A Landmark Provisional Ruling of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on Libya” (02-04-2011) International Law Observer <http://internationallawobserver eu/2011/04/02/
acthpr_provisional_ruling_on_libya/> (accessed 31-08-2011)
162 NJ Udombana “An African Human Rights Court and an African Union Court: A Needful Duality or a 
Needless Duplication?” (2003) 28 Brook J Int’l L 811 826
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its mandate seriously. It is premature to make a decisive assessment on the 
Court’s aptitude based on this single landmark ruling; but it is illustrative of 
the fact that Court’s potential cannot be overruled.
SUMMARY
Litigation of socio-economic rights at international level is a viable option where access to justice at 
the national level is unattainable. International law mechanisms for litigating these rights are therefore 
useful for marginalised groups and people living in poverty. This is also based on the important role 
of these mechanisms in ensuring that States meet the obligations they have committed to in human 
rights treaties, and provide effective remedies in cases of violations. This article assesses, taking into 
consideration some broad principles, the international law mechanisms for litigating socio-economic 
rights at the UN and African regional levels, particularly the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“OP-ICESCR”) and the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights complaints 
mechanisms. The article illustrates that while these mechanisms have the potential to advance the 
rights of the poor and marginalised, and in some case have been successful in doing so, they are not 
without drawbacks that impact on their effectiveness.
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